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Abstract
This essay re-evaluates Schiller's idea of beauty as “freedom
in appearance,” as brought forward in his Kallias or On Beauty
(1793), against the backdrop of early modern and modern
thinking that based itself on a fundamental split between
nature and freedom, world and man.  Schiller's claim that
natural beauty results from freedom in nature bridges this
gap.  His suggestion is confirmed by modern science.
 Schiller's view is recommended and defended as a way of
escaping modern bigotry.
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1. Introductory considerations
a. An implicit suggestion of aesthetics in the modern
era: world connectedness, not unworldliness of man
In the first half of the 1770s, Kant wrote a very interesting
phrase:  “Beautiful things indicate that man fits into the
world.”[1]  If this statement is true, then aesthetics has a
chance to gain high importance for modern thought.  For
aesthetics, then, has the potential to treat and even overcome
the fundamental error on which the modern and contemporary
way of thinking is based, namely the assumption that there
exists an unbridgable gap between humans and the world
because they represent completely different orders:  res
extensa on the part of the world; res cogitans on the part of
the human.
This was indeed the fundamental novelty that developed with
early modern thought:  that the world is in no way tinted by
spirit but radically mindless and determined only by extension,
matter, and purely mechanical laws, while humans were still
considered to be characterized by rationality and thinking.
 This resulted in an allegedly fundamental gap between
humans and the world, the notorious human-world dualism.
 In the face of an intrinsically spiritless world, the human, as
an intrinsically spiritual being, could only be an unworldly
being.
Due to this putative heterogeneity between humans and the
world, humans were supposed to only be able to produce a
world according to their imagination and in no way to
recognize the real world.  The human relationship to the world
had to be constructivist on principle, not realistic; just think of
Kant's theoretical philosophy.  Since that time, modern
thought pursued a fundamental subjectivism regardless of
whether it had a transcendental or historicist or social face.  In
its standard agenda, modern philosophy acted out its
subjectivist birthmark  from the time of Kant through
contemporary analytic philosophy.
The subterranean agenda of modern philosophy, however,
consisted in overcoming this dualism and in developing,
instead of a dichotomy between humans and the world, a new
grasp of the worldliness of humans.  But for a long time all
attempts to achieve this were doomed to failure.  Perhaps the
transition succeeds only in our day.[2]
Aesthetics, this apparently random discipline of philosophy,
operates, if the Kantian statement quoted at the beginning is
true, in its own way on this implicit and also extremely
important task of demonstrating that humans fit into the
world.  This is what I want to make clear in the following by
looking at Schiller.
b. The task of aesthetics according to Kant  and how
Kant failed to fulfill it because of his subjectivist
attitude
But let us first look at Kant one more time.  As I said, pre-
critical Kant had understood beauty as a phenomenon that, in
contrast to the standard view of duality, provides evidence of
our congruence with the world.
The critical Kant, however, began elaborating the logic of
dualism.  In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), he showed
that the physical world represents a strictly lawful nexus of
appearances following the principles of the pure
understanding.  In his Critique of Practical Reason (1788), he
then explained how, for humans as moral beings, not this
physical order but the very different order of freedom is
crucial.  From this arose the big question of how these two
orders can go together, and how, in particular, acts of freedom
are possible in a deterministic world.
In this problem, it is obvious that the dualism of modern
thought appears in concise form.  Kant tried to provide a
solution in his Critique of Judgment  (1790) and therefore
designated this third critique as “mediating the connection of
the two parts of philosophy to a whole.”[3]  The phenomenon
of beauty, on the one hand, and that of the organic, on the
other hand, should make possible “a transition [...] from the
domain of the concepts of nature to the domain of the concept
of freedom”[4] and thus testify that we are entitled to assume
a congruence between our rational expectations and the
structure of the world.  In this way, we should be assured that
we humans are not, as the standard assumption of modern
thought stated, fundamental strangers to the world, but, as
Kant had written twenty years earlier, readily “fit into the
world.”
However, the way that Kant spelled out this role of the
beautiful was unfortunate.  He emphasized far too much the
subjectivity of the judgment of taste.  Stressing subjectivity is
generally the flaw of his philosophical conceptions, especially
of his theory of knowledge, where all claims to objectivity are
reduced to the fulfillment of subjective demands. 
Correspondingly, the aesthetic joy of beauty, according to
Kant, should also result solely from the fulfillment of our
general cognitive intention, which is to achieve a harmony of
sensibility and understanding.[5]  But arguing in this way, Kant
obviously lost the trait which, according to his earlier thinking,
should be decisive for beauty, that is, the experience of a
congruence with the world.  Beauty when construed in merely
subjectivist terms only allows for experiencing the congruence
of powers of the subject, not for experiencing a congruence
with the world.
What Kant generally lacks, in epistemology as in aesthetics, is
a look at the origins of our cognitive patterns.  Where did we
get them from?  Why are they the way they are?  The answer
is not difficult.  These patterns developed in the course of
evolution in alignment with the world.  Therefore the world is
already inscribed in them.  Consequently, there exists a fit
between these patterns and the structure of the world, and
this is the reason why beauty, being based on such patterns,
lets us experience that we “fit into the world.”
Not being aware of this, Kant was unable to present the
beautiful as a phenomenon that demonstrates that we fit into
the world.  Therefore, in its execution, the Critique of
Judgment just does not achieve what it was intended to do:
exhibit the correspondence of the human and the world.
As I have said, subjectivism is the crux of Kantian philosophy.
His successors, however,  have initially seen subjectivism
mainly as an achievement and not as a problem and have
even increased that perspective, especially Fichte and the early
Romantics.
Only a few opposed this tendency and considered subjectivism
as a half truth at most.  Paradigmatically, so did Hegel.  He
scolded the subjective idealism initiated by Kant as a “flat,”
“silly,” even “philistine” idealism.[6]  Hegel's whole effort was
to get beyond this “bad idealism of modern times.”[7]
 Goethe, too, lamented in his later years: “My whole time
departed from me, for it was completely engaged in a
subjective direction, whereas I, with my objective quest, was
at a disadvantage and stood completely alone.”[8]
2. Schiller:  beauty and freedom
Let us now turn to Schiller.  He, too, shared the discomfort
with Kantian subjectivism; he insisted on beauty's objectivity. 
Particularly interesting is the way that Schiller tried to
demonstrate this objectivity.  He did so by connecting beauty
to freedom.  Beauty, according to Schiller, is “freedom in
appearance.”  If this formula holds water, then one can say in
advance that the problem of the Critique of Judgment
dissolves, for a nature that produces beauty does itself already
contains traits of freedom  Hence the realization of human
freedom amidst nature is no problem at all; rather, freedom
represents a continuous factor between the world and humans.
 Consequently, aesthetics can help to overcome the dead end
of modern dualism.
Let us now see in detail how Schiller made this plausible.  I am
referring to letters he wrote to his friend Gottfried Körner in
1793, letters which he gave the title Kallias or on Beauty.[9]
 In my opinion, the concept developed in these letters (which
unfortunately were published only much later, in 1847) is of
utmost importance, much more than the view uttered in the
more famous Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man
published in 1795.
a. Regularity, freedom and beauty
First, Schiller states that we experience those natural things as
beautiful whose formation is based on a rule.  When we regard
a leaf, we immediately get the impression that the manifold
parts of the leaf achieved their artful arrangement by following
a rule.[10]  If this orderliness were to disappear, we would no
longer judge the leaf as beautiful.  So, first, the experience of
beauty is  based on the impression of regularity.
Second, this rule must not be imposed on the object from the
outside but stem from the object itself.[11]  One has to have
the impression that the rule and the corresponding formation
“had flown freely from the thing itself.”[12]  In this case, the
object appears as self-determined, as self-regulated, as
free.[13]
If both conditions are fulfilled, that is, if we perceive the object
as following a rule imposed by itself, then we experience the
object as beautiful.  Therefore the experience of beauty
registers freedom.  Beauty is a cryptogram of freedom.[14]
 Schiller's formula for this reads,  “Beauty is freedom in
appearance.”[15]  This formula does not have a restrictive
meaning.  Schiller does not want to say that, in the case of
beauty, freedom occurs only in the improper form of a
phenomenon (whereas, in its essence, freedom is something
intelligible) but that, in an absolutely positive sense, freedom
is actually appearing, is coming to the fore, manifesting itself,
becoming evident.  Beauty is real experience of freedom via
perception.[16]
b. Objectivity
It is important for Schiller that his explanation of the
perception of beauty as freedom guarantees, contrary to Kant,
the objectivity of beauty.  This is because the regularity that is
the testimony of freedom and simultaneously the reason of
beauty is an objective trait of the object itself, belonging to it
regardless of whether we perceive it or not.[17]  Hence it is a
subject-independent, a truly objective trait.
c. Freedom everywhere, or “In the aesthetic world each
natural being is a free citizen”
Schiller, then, makes two moves.  First, he unmasks the
experience of beauty as an experience of freedom.  We call
those objects beautiful that show freedom.  Second, he
transfers the character of freedom from the human sphere into
the natural world; he sees that it already occurs there. So the
experience of beauty leads us beyond anthropic strettos; 
freedom is by no means just a human but already a natural
phenomenon.  Schiller develops a general ontology of freedom
that comprises not only the sphere of human action but also
the realm of things, of natural as well as of cultural entities.
To quote a longer passage:  “When indeed does one say, that
a person is beautifully clothed?  When neither the clothing
through the body, nor the body through the clothing, suffers
anything in respect to its freedom; when the clothing looks as
if it had nothing to do with the body and yet fulfills its purpose
to the fullest.  Beauty, or rather taste, regards all things as
ends in themselves and by no means tolerates that one serves
the other as means, or bears the yoke.  In the aesthetical
world, every natural being is a free citizen, who has equal
rights with the most noble, and may not even be compelled for
the sake of the whole, but rather must absolutely consent to
everything.  In the aesthetical world, which is entirely different
from the most perfect Platonic republic, even the jacket, which
I carry on my body, demands respect from me for its freedom,
and desires from me, like an ashamed servant, that I let no
one notice that it serves me.  For that reason, however, it also
promises me, reciprocally, to employ its freedom so modestly
that mine suffers nothing thereby; and when both keep their
word, so will the whole world say that I be beautifully
dressed.”[18]
So Schiller suggests, as I stated earlier, an extension of
freedom.  He expands its occurrence beyond human morality
to nature and artifacts.  Aesthetically, one will discover
freedom everywhere:  “The taste will consider all [my
emphasis] things as ends in themselves.”[19]  The whole of
nature is a realm of freedom:  “Every beautiful creature of
nature” is “a lucky citizen who calls out to me:  Be free like I
am.”[20]
Freedom is already a natural phenomenon before being a
human phenomenon.  Accordingly, each natural being is to be
recognized and to be respected as a “free citizen.”  The
difference between human and nature is not the difference
between freedom and unfreedom but both possess freedom.
Everything is, strictly speaking, an instance of freedom. That
freedom is not a human privilege but already a natural fact is
what the aesthetic experience discovers and strongly
recommends to take into account.
In this way, aesthetic experience leads to an ethics of
freedom.  We ought to see all things as figures of freedom and
accordingly treat them with respect.  Freedom is the basic
character of Being.  The aesthetic attitude grasps this basic
character and recommends an ethics of universal respect.
 Here Schiller obviously transcends occidental limitations and
advocates an ethical perspective that is better known in East
Asia (cf. Daoism and Buddhism).  We ought to treat all beings,
all our natural fellow-citizens in this world, with equal respect. 
Typically enough, Schiller also reverses the occidental pattern
according to which freedom is, in the first place, one's own
freedom (just remember Fichte's conception), and only
subsequently the freedom of the other, when he states:  “The
first law of good manners is:  Spare others' freedom.  The
second:  Show freedom yourself.”[21]  And Schiller comments,
“The accurate fulfillment of both is an infinitely difficult
problem, but good manners require it continuously, and it
alone makes the accomplished man of the world.”[22]
d. Aesthetic illusion or actual freedom?
To conclude this interpretation of Schiller, I want to address
two closely related questions.  What does the philosophy of
freedom developed in the Callias Letters look like compared to
the later Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man?  And does
Schiller really take freedom to be an objective property of
natural things (or at least of the beautiful things in nature), or
does he just want us to regard them as figures of freedom,
although in reality they are not (for this cannot be claimed in a
strict sense)?[23]  Is the “kingdom of taste”[24] sketched in
the Callias letters in the end just a realm of illusion, as is the
case with the “aesthetic state”[25] proclaimed in the Letters
on the Aesthetic Education of Man?
The difference between the two concepts is substantial.  In the
Callias Letters, Schiller does not restrict himself, as he will do
in the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, to the human
world, and much less to “only a few select circles,”[26] but
addresses freedom precisely insofar as it reaches beyond the
human realm.  And, most importantly, he understands and
recommends freedom not merely as appearance or as a
regulative idea or the like.  He does not mean that one should
just regard natural things as forms of freedom, though in fact
they are not.  Instead, he is convinced that everything is an
instance of freedom, and that one should take this into
account.
3. Assessment of Schiller's concepts
Let us now turn to a critical assessment of Schiller's position.
a. “Freedom”
A first question concerns Schiller's understanding of freedom.
Schiller sees freedom in place wherever the shape of a natural
object is caused by a self-imposed rule.  The leaf was a case in
point.  Is Schiller's view appropriate and sufficient?
The core of Schiller's perception of freedom is that the shape
of the object is not simply forced by external pressure, but is
due to an intrinsic activity of the object.  It would surely be an
exaggeration to say that the shape results exclusively from
such activity; it goes without saying that external factors also
play a role.  The decisive point is that there exists an
interaction in which the proper shape drive of the object has
its part and that this is recognizable in the result. Schiller
speaks of freedom where such self-formation is in the game
and perceptable.
With organic entities it is certainly the case that they owe their
shape to acts of self-formation.  Their formation is caused not
only by external but also by internal factors; in modern
terminology,  by the genome that presets certain growth and
forming steps that are then implemented in interaction with
the environment.
To be sure, the individual does not invent itself from scratch
but realizes the mode of its species under given environmental
conditions.  But complete self-creation isn't up for debate,
anyway, when we speak of freedom.  (Freedom is not to be
equated with arbitrariness or whateverism.) Moreover, the
mode of the species itself has come about in a process that
involves freedom.  The finally genetically anchored rules have
been developed by the species itself over time, in tune with
external conditions.  In summary, both the emergence of the
properties of the species and the formation of the individual
specimens of this species imply elements of self-formation.  So
Schiller's view is quite right as far as organic beings are
concerned.
b. Is everything natural beautiful?
Of course, this leads directly to a problem.  Schiller's view of
freedom can be applied to all organic entities, but we
experience only some organic beings as beautiful.  If our sense
of beauty were, as Schiller suggests, generally caused by the
perception of self-formation, then we would have to
experience all organic entities as beautiful.  But we don't.
Something seems to be wrong with Schiller's conception.
The best answer to this objection seems to be the following.
Schiller envisages a type of beauty (and increasingly this one
alone) that is essentially an indicator of freedom.  All that
matters to him is to discover traits of freedom, and wherever
he recognizes them he speaks of beauty.  One could rate this
as one-sidedness or even idiosyncrasy, but one should also
keep in mind that the concept and the sense of beauty are not
fixed per se but are culturally and historically variable.
 Schiller, living in the epoch of freedom and initially
enthusiastic about the French Revolution,[27] simply seeks
freedom everywhere and makes beauty the detector of
freedom.  Hence he must, in order to be consistent, regard
any organic shape, if it only shows traits of self-formation, as
beautiful.[28]  This is certainly a very special way of assessing
beauty but also one that can be well understood. For example,
many biologists, by virtue of their special knowledge, regard
creatures as beautiful in each trait that the common man
rather discounts as ugly.
c.  Self-organization and freedom in nature
Is Schiller's proposal to see elements of freedom everywhere
in nature and, therefore, to regard and treat each natural
being as a free citizen, over the top?  Modern science largely
proves Schiller right.  It points out that on many levels nature
exhibits traits of freedom.  This is well-known at the micro
level; the quantum world is not deterministic but displays
spontaneity in many aspects.  The same applies at the macro
level.  Self-reference and self-organization, the fundamental
forms of freedom to be found in the physical world, are the
most basic principles according to which nature brings forth its
structures of order, from galaxies via organisms to social
formations.  Thus freedom is a fundamental and universal
principle of nature or evolution, and of cosmic as well as biotic
and cultural evolution.[29]  Schiller was utterly right in stating
that freedom is already at work in nature.
Furthermore, Schiller's thesis that natural freedom finds its
expression in beauty is supported by contemporary science.
Scientists have found out that prominent types of beauty are
based on the fact that the entities in question have achieved
their shape through processes of self-organization.[30]  This is
the case, for example, with growth patterns following the
“golden angle,” the application of the golden section to a
circle.  Examples are the scales of pine cones or the seeds of
sunflowers but also the arrangement of the eye-spots of the
peacock's fan or the structure of seashells.[31]  In such cases,
our sense of beauty responds to self-similarity that results
from feedback processes and thus is a detector of self-
organization.  So Schiller's theory is confirmed by
contemporary science; beauty is a result of self-
organization.[32]  In summary, Schiller is not only right in
stating that freedom is at work already in nature[33] but
equally justified in his claim that aesthetics can serve as a
guidepost to this fact.
d. Schiller's conception of aesthetics surpasses the
modern, dualistic way of thinking
Let us finally return to the initial deliberations.  Aesthetics, I
said, is capable of curing the basic error of the modern way of
thinking, which is the strict opposition of humans and the
world resulting from an allegedly fundamental ontological
disparity of the two.  In the meantime, we have seen how
Schiller's aesthetics, as outlined in the Callias Letters, does
provide a resolution.  It overcomes modern dualism by
showing that nature is not simply deterministic but includes
phenomena of freedom, and thus is not categorically opposed
to the realm of human freedom but open to it.[34]
Schiller outlines, from an aesthetic point of view, a monism of
freedom instead of the modern dualism.  If the world already
bears dimensions of freedom, then man must not confront the
world as a stranger but can, as Schiller says, welcome and
respect natural things as equal citizens, as kindred instances
of freedom that conversely call out to him, “Be free like I
am.”  Then the opposition of man and world has been
overcome, and we humans can move forward in alliance with
our natural fellow-citizens.
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because it is a violation of nature that indicates heteronomy”
(Schiller, “Kallias oder Über die Schönheit”, l.c., p. 419 f.
[Letter from February 23, 1793]).
[33] From the Romantic period to contemporary philosopher
John McDowell, it was assumed that, after the early and late
modern mechanistic degradation of nature,  we need a "re-
enchantment of nature."  Only then can spirit and nature be
reunified.  This re-enchantment was expected from religion,
philosophy, literature, and new mythologies.  But it failed to
appear.  Hence people currently still complain that this
desideratum is unfulfilled and that we are stuck in the age-old
plight.  But those who talk like that must have overslept the
insights of recent science.  Only this can explain such an
unawareness that this "re-enchantment" has long since
occurred, just not by the instances one had banked on but, of
all things, by the instance from which one had not expected
anything good and which,therefore, one ignored:
 contemporary science.  This one gave us, in fact, a wonderful
equivalent of "re-enchantment," namely a scientific view of
nature offering everything one can wish for in order to get
beyond the old mechanism and dualism.  In this essay, I have
tried to show how Schiller's aesthetic conception provided good
means for that.
[34] If Kant had understood nature this way, he could have
saved his third critique.
